At least and ignorance: a reply to Coppock and Brochhagen (2013)

Bernhard Schwarz

Abstract


This commentary revisits Coppock and Brochhagen’s (2013) account of implications of
speaker ignorance attested for sentences with unembedded at least. The general principle that
Coppock and Brochhagen propose to derive inferences about the speaker’s information state is
shown to not fully derive the intended ignorance implications for at least sentences and also
for disjunctions. A variant of Coppock and Brochhagen’s account is formulated, which for
unembedded at least sentences replicates the effects of an earlier proposal in Büring (2008).

EARLY ACCESS VERSION

Keywords


ignorance inferences; at least; quantity implicature; inquisitive semantics

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.9.10

License URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0

ISSN: 1937-8912

Journal doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp