Some-things-considered desire
Main Article Content
Abstract
Conflicting desire ascriptions — ascriptions of the form ⌜S wants p⌝ and ⌜S wants ¬p⌝ — falsify every extant semantics that takes the orthodox, and theoretically powerful, belief-based approach to desire ascriptions. In many cases, these semantics wrongly predict that conflicting desire ascriptions can’t both be true. In response, I propose a semantics of some-things-considered, other-things-ignored desire, which I model with questions — lending further evidence to the view that questions are central in our cognitive lives.
Article Details
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.
Articles appearing in Semantics and Pragmatics are published under an author agreement with the Linguistic Society of America and are made available to readers under a Creative Commons Attribution License.